This is one of those times of maximum mismatch between the optimistic rhetoric of peace process declarations and expectations and the gloomy reality of daily experience and prospects on the ground.

The Annapolis architect, President George W. Bush, is back in the Middle East, still declaring the worthy goal of peace in '08. But the fundamentally flawed logic of the process initiated last year is increasingly transparent.

The economic, social and health conditions of Gazans collapse further as the siege continues; rockets fall on southern Israel; settlements keep growing, and, not surprisingly, Palestinians and Israelis scoff at the peace merry-go-round.

The centerpiece of the current effort is to conclude negotiations outlining a two-state agreement between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and PLO chairman Mahmoud Abbas.

The first thing to say is that this is unlikely to happen. Israel's key negotiators, Olmert and his foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, have traveled an impressive distance in their own personal political journeys towards acceptance of the two-state paradigm.

Yet their positions still fall short of a 100 percent arrangement on pre-1967 territory (even with land swaps) that will be necessary to strike a workable deal.

Olmert faces new and potentially tenure-threatening police investigations; Israel's governing coalition is shaky and the United States is not inclined to assertively carry its Israeli ally over the finishing line.

Likewise the Palestinian interlocutor not only faces an "opposition" which actually won a substantial majority of parliamentary seats in elections but is also increasingly isolated within its own Fatah movement. These divisions create the worst conditions for a Palestinian leader to sign off on an historic compromise.

Making matters worse is the shared assumption that any agreement reached will not be implemented in the foreseeable future.

Israel, with American support, has made clear that the Palestinians must meet all their Road Map obligations before two states can become a reality. Expect that message to feature prominently in any domestic Israeli marketing of a deal. Abbas knows this; another reason for his lack of enthusiasm to sign on.

And if signatures are attached to a piece of paper and nothing changes in the real lives or security of Israelis or Palestinians, then the belief of both publics in the peace option is likely to erode even further. Hope, or the mere promise of a better future, is no longer enough. Israelis and Palestinians have been there before. It is a tarnished currency.

That is why the logic of Annapolis - that an agreement on paper creates the conditions for its own implementation - is so flawed.

Israel could, but has chosen not to, take effective measures to enhance Fatah's standing (on checkpoints, settlements and transferring security responsibility).

Fatah could, but has chosen not to, work with Hamas to unify, strengthen and re-capacitate the Palestinian national movement as a partner to achieve de-occupation and deliver security predictability.

So both sides play along with this artificial Annapolis process. The American sponsor, mistaking fiction for reality, urges them to seal the deal.

A respected Palestinian analyst, Hussein Agha, commented to me recently that "Israel cannot make peace with Abbas for one simple reason - Israel is not at war with Abbas." The Israeli and Palestinian negotiators have declared themselves to be partners, not adversaries.

The Palestinian Authority security forces under Abbas's authority present no military threat to Israel; rather they operate according to limitations (geographic, hours of deployment, etc.) defined by Israel. The Fatah-affiliated militias that do continue to target Israel and Israelis do so against the instructions of Abbas - a fact recognized by Israel.

Abbas can vanquish neither these forces nor Hamas (and neither can the Israeli Defense Forces). The Israeli army operating in the West Bank provides security to Israelis, primarily settlers, but also to the PA regime, thereby sustaining it in power.

Abbas's repudiation of violence is courageous, and his determination to pursue negotiations even while settlements expand and checkpoints flourish is sincere, even touching.

All this might be laudable, but it renders the existing peace talks almost inconsequential. For while hostilities have ceased between the PA and Israel and peace papers are drafted, the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis continues.

The two peoples are locked in an adversarial relationship involving much violence, occupation and anger. This is not reflected in the dealings between their leaders.

Israel can no more end the violence by making a deal with Abbas than the United States can end the hostilities in Afghanistan by reaching an agreement with President Hamid Karzai.

And that is why what we have now is a make-believe process.

It doesn't have to be this way. Options do exist for making this process more meaningful and capable of delivering results: engaging, even indirectly, with Hamas; addressing the external actors, such as Iran and Syria, which are helping to shape the environment in which Hamas and others operate; facilitating a renewed Palestinian unity understanding whereby Abbas as a negotiator would also be representing that broader Palestinian adversary.

These options are not on the agenda. They should be. For as it currently stands, the Annapolis process is a chimera, and one likely to do more harm than good.

While neither campaign has come out of the episode bathed in glory,  the way in which Senator McCain manipulated this raises some worrying questions as to just how irresponsible on national security his campaign is willing to be to score points.  The NYT has a good factual account of the story, including the quotes from a WABC radio interview by senior Hamas adviser Ahmed Yousef and the responses of the respective campaigns.  Yousef did not endorse Obama and Obama was not fishing for endorsements off the Gazan coast.  Gazans do not have a vote in US elections (they did though vote in American-sponsored elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council, the results of which the Bush administration then attempted to overturn by arming up a faction within Fatah, as David Rose recently exposed in Vanity Fair).

Obviously the McCain spin was all about politics.  But the substantive policy piece of this should not be ignored.  As has been clarified on numerous occasions by Senator Obama, the candidates’ policies are identical on the issue of Hamas—a terrorist organization with whom there will be no engagement.  That symmetry is rather a shame.  Current policy, including toward Hamas, is not working.  It is not delivering security to Israelis or Palestinians, not advancing the peace process and not contributing to overall re-stabilization in a dangerously radicalized Middle East.  Israel is currently in the midst of considering Egyptian-mediated ceasefire possibilities with Hamas.  Very senior Israeli officials and ex-officials, including ex-Mossad chief Efraim Halevy, ex-National Security Adviser Giora Eiland, and former Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, are advocating Israeli engagement, direct or indirect, with Hamas.  And sitting ministers and parliamentarians (albeit somewhat constrained by coalition discipline) are making similar noises.  The Israeli government and defense establishment are in constant contact with a variety of regional and international officials and non-officials who meet with, and are able to convey a better understanding of, Hamas and its positions.  Laura Rozen has a very thoughtful piece on this in MoJo.

In the run-up to last November’s Israeli-Palestinian Annapolis peace conference, over 60 prominent Americans led by Brent Scowcroft, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Lee Hamilton, and Carla Hills signed a letter to President Bush and Secretary Rice (initiated by the New America Foundation, among others) that argued: “As to Hamas, we believe that…dialogue…is far preferable to its isolation” and that if “Hamas is ostracized, prospects that they will play a spoiler role increase dramatically.”  Former Secretary of State Colin Powell has adopted a similar position. 

For John McCain, Hamas policy (or lack thereof) is part of his parroting of Bush’s talk-to-no-one policy and his more-of-the-sameness.  Barack Obama has embraced the idea that tough diplomacy, even with adversaries, might actually have a role in problem solving, but that Hamas is a non-state actor and listed terrorist organization, and therefore is not on the to-be-engaged list.  It’s a reasonable distinction to draw even if there are, of course, no Palestinian interlocutors who are ‘state actors’.  Obama in general has demonstrated diplomatic sophistication in his Middle East pronouncements, and these were on display again in an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg of the Atlantic,  where the Illinois Senator gave vent to his deep familiarity with the Zionist idea, the meaning of Israel in Jewish life and the impact that the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict has on the region. 

Much has been made of the role or lack thereof of Robert Malley in the Obama campaign.  The Malley association was being used by various groups to misrepresent Obama and Malley has now stepped down from what was anyway an informal association with the campaign.  Malley is the director of the Middle East program at the International Crisis Group and a former Special Assistant to President Clinton for Arab-Israeli Affairs (full disclosure:  he is also a friend and former  colleague). 

In his professional role, it is Malley’s job to understand the Middle East, the major players and forces, their considerations and the backdrop against which decisions and policy options can be evaluated.   As such, Malley has met with the Hamas leadership as well as with leaderships and opposition in a range of countries across the region, including Israel.  That is called expertise and a deep, first-hand understanding.  It is what you have in the room if you do not want to be Chalabied time and again when you make foreign policy.  Not setting oneself up to be Chalabied by filling a room with ignorance and ideological groupthink is part of the change that is required in November.  The Robert Malley’s should be in the room.  US and Israeli officials frequently seek his counsel.  By the way, the under-attack Robert Malley’s impeccable credentials have also been defended in this letter from his former colleagues and the most respected Israel policy-hands.

But what of the dangerous irresponsibility on display in the McCain campaign.  McCain wants to stay 100 years in Iraq, to bomb bomb bomb Iran, continue ignoring Syria.  He makes no mention of the peace process (unlike Obama in his Israel at 60 greeting), and wants to turn up the heat on Russia and China at the same time. 

So how does this link back to our Gaza chap Mr. Yousef.  There are two ways of interpreting Ahmed’s Yousef comments on the American election:  the first, is that as a member of Hamas’s pragmatist camp, which has reached out to the West before, Yousef is genuinely hoping for a dialogue with the US and that the differences between the US and non al-Qaeda political Islamists, like Hamas, can actually be bridged.  That interpretation makes sense to me and would be a rather encouraging sign. In unequivocally rejecting Hamas, Obama would seem not to adhere to this interpretation.  Again though, Obama makes an important distinction in his Goldberg interview:

I welcome the Muslim world’s accurate perception that I am interested in opening up dialogue and interested in moving away from the unilateral policies of George Bush, but nobody should mistake that for a softer stance when it comes to terrorism or when it comes to protecting Israel’s security or making sure that the alliance is strong and firm

Everything suggests that McCain would categorically reject seeing Yousef’s comment as outreach.  So how else can one explain Yousef’s comments? 

Like this: it’s a play out of the Karl Rove book of political psych-ops.  Why?  Well, McCain equals a continuation of Bush policies that have strengthened Hamas and have undermined Hamas’s competition—the moderate Western allies.  So Hamas has thrown some encouraging words in Obama’s direction, anticipating the predictable responses, thereby intentionally harming him—and helping McCain.  Right Karl?

Either McCain is wrong about Hamas (interpretation 1), or he has fallen into their trap, been suckered, and given a foreign agent (and one he defines as terrorist at that) a prominent role in an American election. Neither version exactly flatters the Arizona Senator. McCain doesn’t recognized psych-ops?  Who would’ve thunk it? 

Quick quiz:  Which is the appropriate response for an anti-terror warrior: “I will not lend a hand to this attempt by terrorists to intervene in the American electoral process”; or “Dear voters, listen to the terrorists, send me cash.”?

It started at the time of the ‘good’ Iraq war.  You remember—the one whose ambitions were limited to ensuring continued access to Kuwaiti oil—not the contemporary Iraq tri-fecta effort—to own the oil, change the regime, and transform the region.

So there I was in January of 1991, working in London as the political officer of the Union of Jewish Students, arguing Israel's case on campus (and attempting to do so from within as liberal a discourse as could be summoned for the occasion), while Tel Aviv came under scud missile attack from Iraq. I signed up for one of the Jewish community's solidarity missions and went off to Israel to receive my obligatory gas mask and, well, kill time in between the curfews and sirens.

The Tel Aviv that I came to love and that I now consider to be my home was displaying its customary irreverence—Baghdad Café on Ben Yehuda Street became the obvious tongue-in-cheek hang out for the short duration of the scud crisis.

The trip solidified my own decision to make Israel my home. By year’s end, I had upped sticks and made aliyah (emigrated to Israel, literally 'gone up'). I have been fortunate enough to have pursued my interest (well obsession really) of advancing Arab-Israeli peace both in and out of government in Israel and now in a brief sojourn in Washington D.C. (though not fortunate enough to have succeeded, yet).

For anyone steeped in the narrative of contemporary Jewish history, or any neutral observer for that matter, Israel’s achievements are rather remarkable. It is a new nation forged from the remnants of European Jewry and immigrants from across the Middle East, a biblical language dusted-off and modernized, and it possesses that most precious resource – gifted human capital. Israel today is at the cutting edge of contemporary creativity, not only in the high-tech fields that keep the economy buzzing along impressively, but also in the arts—witness the latest batch of award-winning Israeli movies. Israel's premier basketball team, Maccabi Tel Aviv, is a permanent fixture in Europe's Final Four. Tel Aviv itself is a gloriously hip and hedonist bubble of escapism.

And yet that same escapism is also frustrating, even infuriating. Not twenty kilometers from liberal Tel Aviv is a reality that is unforgiveably ignored. In the West Bank, Israel imposes one of the longest, last remaining and most de-humanizing of occupations in the world on Palestinian population.  Worse, the Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel are not part of this nation-building exercise, subjected to ongoing and structurally-embedded discrimination.

To try to understand that co-existence of modern cosmopolitan Israel with the Israel of permanent violent occupation, it's worth going back to that rather silly 1991 solidarity visit and those scud misiles. Ah, of course, Israel is under permanent threat from an relentless foe, or set of foes, unswervingly committed to its destruction, to a second holocaust—it has to be like that. The conversation normally ends there. If it continues, it's about why embattled Israel deserves empathy, maybe a prayer, along with the unconditional support of the U.S., and why it should certainly avoid making risky territorial concessions.

Thankfully though it doesn't end there. Israel does have enemies, bitter, even implacable ones. But Israel also has the most powerful military in the region and it's most sophisticated military-industrial complex and R+D capacity.  It is one of the world's largest arms exporters and has an economy that is the envy of its neighbors.

The disconnect, I would argue, is that Israel has locked itself into a box of fear that is not only substantially self-generated and all-embracing, but has also become a danger in itself, preventing Israel from taking urgently needed steps. Explaining that fear is easy—remember the Holocaust, look at how Israel is targetted—it does not though alter the fact that it has become utterly unhealthy and paralyzing, and ironically a reason to actually be concerned.

Post 9/11 America knows a thing or two about the dangers of a policy and popular discourse—driven by nurturing and abusing people's fears. Now imagine living in a country whose self-understanding is that it is 3am all the time and that bloody red phone never stops ringing. Welcome to Israel—not the reality of Israel but the sense of self that has been formed. Every enemy is a potential Hitler, every threat an existential one, there is a fatalism and almost a desire to retreat into a ghetto and build a big wall (in fact there is a wall, its called the separation barrier). 

This is how one of Israel's smartest political commentators (and occasional basketball reporter) Ofer Shelach, put it in yesterday’s Ma'ariv newspaper:

Sixty years have gone by, and we still do not accept the very idea that it is certain that we will still be here twice as long…A very powerful propaganda machine, some of it deliberate and most of it self-inflicted, works against this simple and normal premise…Anyone who sees themselves as constantly on the defensive against a Holocaust, whose politicians, when they court votes, instead of promising hope and change, purport to be defending against destruction, such politics recognizes no limits, because when you are defending yourself against a Holocaust, there is no limit to the degree of force, and it has no purpose except that of survival.

The point is, of course, that this is not 1938. It has not been 1938 since 1948, so to speak, since Israel’s creation. Sixty years later Israel is in an extremely favorable position to establish permanent, recognizable and defensible borders and be accepted in the region. Many states live with a degree of insecurity, face certain manageable threats, as Israel will likely have to.  But they avoid hysteria and calibrate their national security postures, their deployments and responses, accordingly. Belatedly, so too must Israel.

The entire Arab League, via the Arab Initiative, has expressed its willingness to accept, recognize and live in security with an Israel that ends the occupation of 1967 (not 1948). The Palestinian PA-Fatah leadership in Ramallah has the same position, while Hamas has stated their acceptance of a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders.  Even Iran has said it would respect a deal authorized by a legitimate Palestinian leadership. So Israel has a choice, has an alternative to oy vey every day, and there are plenty of other fissures in Israeli society that require some well-overdue attention.

Michael Chabon's wonderful novel The Yiddish Policeman's Union is set against the backdrop of Israel having lost the 1948 War of Independence, with the Jews having been given a long-term lease in part of Alaska—The Federal District of Sitka. If I am wrong, and Israel is constantly on the verge of destruction, violently rejected by its neighbors even within the 1967 lines, and condemned to live by the sword in perpetuity, then bring out the thermals, Sitka here we come. Such an Israel would represent a danger to, rather than a cornerstone of, Jewish continuity.

But Chabon's work is fiction. Israel won that 1948 war. Sixty years later an Arab and Muslim offer is on the table—we accept '48 if you undo '67.

If Israel can overcome its own fears and embrace the hope and the courage on which it was founded, then forget Alaska, we can continue to sun our buns on the warm shores of the Mediterranean, ad meyer ve'esrim as we say, til one-hundred and twenty, and thensome.

Trying to get some progress on easing this closure—which is a prerequisite for improving Palestinian daily life and economic prospects—was again a focus of Secretary Rice’s visit to Israel and the PA this past weekend.

Rice met with the Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak on no less than three occasions in the course of what was only a two-day visit.  The main subject of these confabs:  these restrictions on movement.  On the one hand Rice scores high for perseverance and effort—and not just because one meeting with Barak, let alone three, is not much fun.  But alongside that it is remarkable, and not in a good way, that the top diplomat of the world’s only superpower is reduced to the role of arguing over and counting a couple of dozen obstacles to movement out of a total of over 600 in place in the West Bank. 

In his wonderfully insightful and honest new book “The Much Too Promised Land:  America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace”, Aaron David Miller discusses what he calls ‘Gulliver’s troubles’—how America as a great power is made to look Lilliputian when it gets sucked in to unsuccessful micro-management by the small powers of the Middle East. 

The checkpoint debacle is the perfect example of a phenomenon that Miler accurately identifies. 

Secretary Rice, to be fair, seems not particularly amused and is beginning to suggest that she is aware that not only is she being given the run around, but that ‘improving’ the occupation is something of a thankless task;  while ending it—well that’s also not so easy.  It appears that Rice now realizes that the latter may actually be more doable than the former. 

Here’s how she responded to press questions on the checkpoints and settlements issue during her Ramallah stop with PA President Abbas:

The best way to handle all of this, of course, is to get an agreement because we need to have a Palestinian state and Israeli state.  We need to know what belongs in each of them. 

Rice also began drawing the distinction that ‘not all checkpoints are created equal’, suggesting that she would start focusing on the real bottlenecks rather than just a numbers game. 

Thus far precious little has been achieved either in the border negotiations or in improving the day-to-day realities.

Here is the situation: 

Israel maintains an elaborate network of obstacles to Palestinian freedom of movement in the West Bank—for the most reliable data visit the website of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs—Occupied Palestinian Territories (OCHA).  That closure system includes manned checkpoints, fixed-barriers, earth-mounds and fences—in total they number over 600.  These are not, repeat not, checkpoints or obstacles that prevent Palestinians from entering Israel proper—that function is fulfilled by the wall/separation barrier and by crossing terminals.  These are physical obstacles to movement whose function is to prevent Palestinians from moving freely within the West Bank—from getting to one village or town to another within the Palestinian areas.

To get a sense of the dimensions involved, the West Bank—home to 2.6 million Palestinians and 600 such obstacles—is smaller than the size of the state of Delaware, the 49^th largest state in the Union.

The Israeli army (IDF) maintains this network of restrictions for two ostensible reasons:  (1) it helps keep control, keeps tabs on what is going on in the West Bank, provides useful intel, which makes the lives of militants more difficult…etc.; and thus is part of an overall preventive security deployment (2) to protect the freedom of movement of Israelis in the West Bank—mainly the settlers and also the IDF itself.  The approximately 260,000 Israeli settlers living in the West Bank of course face no such restrictions on movement.  The IDF is doing its job—as long as there are Israeli citizens in the Occupied Palestinian Territories—settlers—the IDF is duty bound to protect them.  They should not be there—but while they are—the IDF provides their defense.  Unless and until the occupation ends, this will be the lot of the IDF—a terrible drain in itself on the military—but that is also another story.

The effects—on Palestinian daily life, society, family life, and economic opportunity—is devastating.  Oh, and people are very angry—more easily recruited to violence…etc.  So all this aggravation, yet the net result is that it actually makes Israel’s security worse in the long-term. 

So what is the correct scorecard on checkpoints and obstacles to freedom of movement:  Here are the numbers from OCHA—the credible source—that even the IDF asks to verify checkpoint removal when it happens: 

Current count—612

Count during the previous Rice visit on March 30^th (when Israel promised the removal of 50)—580

Count when Annapolis launched (November ’07)—561.

And just to round it all off:  the count when Secretary Rice negotiated the Agreement on Movement and Access (November ’05, designed to systematically reduce the closure and the date from which OCHA keeps score)—376. 

Now there’s progress!!

The World Bank by the way argues that if these restrictions are not removed, the Palestinian economy will continue to contract—even if all of the pledged donor aid is disbursed.

And one final, yet more disturbing thing to note:  the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem is reporting that there are IDF attempts to intentionally falsify data by putting up obstacles just in order to film their being removed—in order to claim (presumably to the US) that action is really being taken.

Here is an excerpt from a newly released B’Tselem report, which can be read in full here:

On March 31^st , the army placed three obstructions made of boulders and dirt piles on the road running between Deir al-Ghussun and al-Jarushiya, which lie about one kilometer apart, north of Tulkarm.  According to local residents, the next day, an Israeli bulldozer removed the three obstructions, while an army film crew documented the obstructions before and during their removal.  These obstructions appear…on the list of physical obstructions that the army contends were removed as part of its efforts to ‘ease’ Palestinian movement.

Tomorrow I will indeed be celebrating Israel’s 60^th anniversary—Israel is a truly remarkable achievement—but not the checkpoints, not the occupation—they are not something to celebrate.

Perhaps predictably, this became a domestic political issue inside Israel. 

Likud and opposition leader MK Benjamin Netanyahu wasted no time in attacking Prime Minister Olmert:

The Golan must remain in Israel’s hands…I am quite amazed that the Prime Minister promises to hand over all of the Golan Heights even before negotiations begin, and with such flippancy…this is no way to build peace...[Olmert is] a serial concession giver.

All to be expected, except this:  as Prime Minister in the late 90s, Netanyahu himself ran a secret back-channel with Syria in which he, too, well, how to put this—agreed to withdraw from all of the Golan.

The Netanyahu-Assad talks used Ronald S. Lauder—now World Jewish Congress President—as an intermediary. 

Prospects For Peace has obtained an exclusive copy of the actual negotiating documents—the content was made public before, but this is the first time the documents, with hand-written dates and all, are being posted.  Here are a couple of key extracts from that document entitled ‘Treaty of Peace Between Israel and Syria’: 

2.   Israel will withdraw from the Syrian lands taken in 1967, in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which establish the right of all states to secure and recognized borders and the ‘land for peace’ formula, to a commonly agreed border based on the international line of 1923.  The withdrawal will be effected in 3 stages, over a period of […] months, with full normalization being completed by the end of withdrawal (exchange of ambassadors at the outset)……

6.   Security arrangements will be carried out through the establishment of 3 zones on both sides of the border, in phases that parallel the stages of Israeli withdrawal (as marked in the enclosed map): a) a demilitarized zone; b) a zone of limited forces  and armaments; c) a zone where only non-offensive capability should be positioned.

In truth, it’s not the most sophisticated or well put-together draft peace treaty ever written—but there you have it. 

Prime Minister Olmert’s bureau reminded MK Netanyahu of these flirtations with papa Assad, releasing the following quote: 

Netanyahu was the one who sent an American businessman to Assad the father to give up the Golan Heights, on behalf of the people of Israel, even before any negotiations had begun (as reported in the April 28^th edition of Maariv by Maya Bengal and Amit Cohen).

President Clinton confirmed the story in his own memoirs—My Life.  Here is Clinton discussing Israeli-Syrian talks:

Peres [Shimon—when PM in ’96—DL] wanted me to sign a security treaty with Israel if it gave up the Golan, an idea that was suggested to me later by Netanyahu and would be advanced again by [Ehud] Barak.

In the 1999 Israeli election campaign when Netanyahu suggested that he would be tougher on Assad and any Golan concessions than his opponent Ehud Barak, he was confronted from a surprising direction.  Netanyahu’s previous Defense Minister, Yitzhak Mordechai, had bolted the government to lead up a new Center Party and in an election debate, when Netanyahu made his “tougher on the Golan” claim, Mordechai dropped a bomb: “Look me in the eye Bibi and say that.  Look me in the eye.” Mordechai knew of the Lauder channel and Netanyahu’s bluff had been called. 

The whole story suggests that not only does Bibi have a truth-telling problem when it comes to Syria-Golan issues (or at least a selective memory) but worse than that, he even hid information from both President Clinton and Ehud Barak that undermined later negotiations.

Here is how Dennis Ross—former Special Middle East Coordinator—describes in his book The Missing Peace what Clinton was told about the Lauder episode. Ross tells us how, at Clinton’s request, Lauder shared the 10-point paper.  Here is how Ross recalls his own response:

Once I had looked this over, the President asked me what I thought.  I told him it was ‘too good to be true.’ But now I understood why Barak and his colleagues believed they did not need to commit to the June 4 lines…So Clinton sent the paper Lauder had given him to Assad (faxed to the personal attention of the Ambassador, who was instructed to hand deliver it without comment to Assad)…Two days later, Assad responded, calling the President to say that Syria had not accepted this paper, and would not now.

Only later did Lauder apparently come clean and tell the full story—the parts he had kept from both the American and Israeli leaders (and that Netanyahu had also hidden): 

In mid-September 1999 Ronald Lauder sent a letter to President Clinton enclosing an eight-point paper which he claimed included the final points that had been agreed upon by both sides in 1998.  Gone was the reference to the 1923 borderline, replaced by withdrawal to a commonly agreed border based on the June 4, 1967 lines.  Syrian concerns were clearly addressed, but this was a very different paper from the ten points we had been shown…Lauder’s ‘clarifying letter’ to President Clinton indicate that Bibi Netanyahu had committed to withdrawal to the June 4 lines.

Now don’t get me wrong, I think it’s a good thing that Netanyahu understands the need to negotiate with Syria and that for those negotiations to succeed, Israel will need to commit to a full Golan withdrawal.  What is worrying is that Netanyahu continues to hoodwink both the Israeli public and his cheerleader crew in the US—and that both Lauder and Netanyahu only partially and misleadingly disclosed their negotiation effort to the Americans and Israeli leaders when they resumed the Syria contacts—an act of dangerous diplomatic irresponsibility. 

One other thing about the handwritten date on the original Netanyahu-Lauder Israel-Syria Peace Treaty revealed here—it is Saturday August 29, 1998.  Whoops—the religious parties won’t like that one Bibi—desecrating the Sabbath and giving up the Golan—what a shanda!

Lots of questions though remain unanswered, including why release the information now, what does this mean for an escalation in Israeli-Syrian tensions, or conversely a breakthrough in back-channel peace negotiations, what does it mean for the US-North Korea talks, and why would Syria have been pursuing a nuclear program?

Here is a quick attempt to look those issues. 

1. What were the Syrians up to and why? 

Here is the AFP on the bottom line of yesterday’s briefing: 

They said US intelligence had "high confidence" that the structure bombed by the Israelis was a nuclear reactor, "medium confidence" that the North Koreans were involved in building it, and "low confidence" that plutonium from it was for nuclear weapons…Because other elements of a weapons program, such as a plutonium reprocessing plant, had not been detected, US intelligence was less certain that the plutonium was for nuclear weapons, they said.

But the evidence and photos, if they are to be taken at face value, were certainly impressive and convincing according to those who attended the briefing.  Writing in the Washington Post, Robin Wright did add this note of caution:  “The sole photograph shared with reporters depicting Syrian and North Korean officials together did not appear to be the Al Kibar reactor site.”

And David Albright president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) and a former US weapons inspector urged skepticism regarding there being an active Syrian weapons program.

Syrian officials both before and after today’s briefing have been adamant that no such program exists.  According to Haaretz, Israeli intelligence officials are suggesting that “Most senior members of his [Assad’s] regime in Damascus apparently were not aware that the country had a nuclear program.” 

If indeed, as seems to be the case, Syria was up to something, here is a possible explanation as to why:  Syria is unlikely to feel that it needs a nuclear weapons capacity, or is capable of sustaining a serious program, but the beginnings of a program and a facility might be a useful bargaining chip in any future negotiation with the US (and as part of a triangular US-Israel-Syria negotiation).

2. Why now, and is it all about Matzah? 

The Israeli military strike occurred over 7 months ago, so why did the administration choose to go public only now?  If you want an American-centric take on the timing, then this one sounds most plausible:  those both inside and outside the administration who are keen to torpedo the North Korea talks finally notched up a success having worked their friends and allies in Congress in order to force this outcome.   John Bolton was doing a particularly good impression of a Cheshire cat yesterday.  Juan Cole speculates on his blog that the timing was a useful distraction from the latest revelations on the arrest of an alleged Israeli spy in the US.  The DPKR-Syria story was unquestionably a reminder for the US of the effectiveness and usefulness of Israeli intelligence (MJ Rosenberg has a wonderful op-ed in today’s Haaretz on some of the other implications of the latest spy story). 

If one is looking for a more Israelo-centric view of the timing, then this is about Matzah.  How so?  Well Israel’s Knesset goes into a long recess over the Passover holiday, which means that the government doesn’t have to face votes of no confidence or embarrassing questions.  What seems to have happened is that Israel and Syria have coordinated the public release of new information regarding secret peace negotiations partly in order to reduce tensions generated by the North Korea disclosure (see point 4).  These new leaks about back-channel talks have mobilized the anti-Golan withdrawal right wing within Israel but at a time when they cannot take their action to the Knesset.  In short, Passover is a good time to bury problematic stories—anyway Jewish-Israeli stomachs are far too concentrated on their Matzah-induced stomach problems to care about political shenanigans.

3. And If Now, Was It Wise?

Here was the claim made at yesterday’s briefing:

The administration said it withheld the pictures for seven months out of fear that Syria could retaliate against Israel and start a broader war in the Middle East.

Yet this claim on timing flies in the face of logic—the material has been released when things are even more tense and significantly so after the assassination of Imad Moughniyeh and the passing of the mourning period of 40 days since his death. The Israelis are extremely antsy about this, and I think this together with intel exposure reasons explains why the Israeli security establishment was so unenthusiastic about this material being made public now.  It is surely more dangerous now than then.

The Israeli security establishment perspective is reported in today’s Haaretz:

Senior Israeli defense sources said last night that it was still early to gauge how Damascus would react to the news, but warned that the Syrians may now reconsider and decide to retaliate against Israel in some way...In recent internal discussions, senior Israeli defense establishment officials expressed concern that the official American release of details about the strike would embarrass Syrian leader Bashar Assad, and lead him to take a more aggressive stance toward Israel.

And there’s more:

Defense Minister Ehud Barak opposed the release of any new details on the attack or the nuclear ties between Damascus and Pyongyang, arguing that this would only push the Syrians into a corner and would escalate tensions.

This is one more demonstration that the neocons who pushed for this have their own agenda—and to the extent to which it dovetails an Israeli agenda—it is the agenda of the opposition on Israel’s far-right and has nothing to do with actual Israeli security interests (or any logical reading of American interests for that matter).

There is still of course the question of why none of this was taken to the IAEA over the past seven months or before.

4. Israel-Syria:  Peace or War

All of this is taking place against the backdrop of new leaks and speculation regarding an Israeli-Syrian back-channel to resume peace negotiations. 

In his Passover holiday media interview one week ago, Prime Minister Olmert hinted that something was cooking.  Ma’ariv columnist Ben Caspit had this to say:

Is there or is there not a channel of negotiations with Syria?  Olmert merely hints at who, at this stage, is preventing such a dialogue.  His name is George W. Bush.  When will it be possible for Israel to talk to Syria?  When Bush leaves the White House.

Then earlier this week reports started coming from the Syrian side.  “Three unofficial media outlets in Syria—the daily Al-Watan, the Dunia television station and the Champress website”—revealed messages from Olmert to Assad via the Turkish PM Erdogan.  That message, according to Syrian Expatriate Affairs Minister and Bashar confidante, Dr. Buthaina Shaaban:

Olmert notified Turkey that he was willing for a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights in return for a peace agreement that is based on UN resolutions and on international criteria.

President Assad then himself confirmed the stories in an interview to the Qatari daily al-Watan newspaper.  The full text of the interview will be published Sunday, but the teaser included the following:

The Syrian president confirmed that Erdogan had ‘relayed to me Israel’s readiness to withdraw from the Golan Heights in return for peace with Syria’…Assad also noted that ‘direct negotiations need a sponsor and, unfortunately, this sponsor can only be the U.S. This is the reality of the situation. But the current administration has no vision and no will to support a peace process…perhaps with a future administration in the U.S., we would be able to speak of direct negotiations.’

So here is a delicious and rare moment of Israeli-Syrian agreement: : we both want to talk, the nature of the Syria-Israel issue is that we both need US facilitation, the Bush Administration is not interested and so, we will have to wait.  Commenting in Israel’s leading daily, Yediot Aharonot, analyst Shimon Shiffer, who is very close to Olmert, speculated:

Let’s start from the end. Notwithstanding the messages between Olmert and Assad, it is almost certain that the negotiations will not be renewed in the near future—at least not until the next tenant takes up residence in the White House in January 2009 and sponsors an initiative to revitalize the negotiations with American patronage and financial support.

Shiffer’s piece unsurprisingly was entitled “Waiting for the Next President” and even if both sides are exaggerating a little, the symmetry of message and US role (negative) is breath-taking. 

Martin Indyk—director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and former US Ambassador to Israel—summed it up in testimony yesterday to the House FRC, Sub-Committee on Middle East:

As I understand it, the Bush Administration is unwilling to encourage Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations…this puts the U.S. in the unprecedented and invidious position of opposing an opportunity for Arab-Israeli peacemaking even when our ally Israel is keen to pursue it.

 5.   A Last Gasp Test for Condoleezza Rice

Secretary Rice did not have a stunning record at the NSC for pushing back against extreme neocon influence, there has been the sense of a slight improvement during her term at State, and most notably in moving the Korea Six-party talks and breakthrough direct negotiations.  This is now threatened by the new revelations.  It would not be unfair to argue that this really becomes a test for Secretary Rice as to whether she can keep the North Korea process on track in the face of what seems to be a well coordinated effort instigated by neo-cons both inside and outside the administration to derail that process. 

It’s likely to be her final test in this respect (unless…Iran…)

On the Israeli-Palestinian front the President was hosting PLO Chair Mahmoud Abbas at the White House while the real action was taking place in Cairo where the Egyptians and Hamas leadership were announcing a new ceasefire proposal for Gaza.  There is little doubt as to which event was more relevant to future stability and creating a security environment conducive to it. In the international, and certainly Israeli press, the Cairo development took center-stage while the Abbas-Bush hug-in was very much a side-show. 

The more head-lining grabbing event in Washington yesterday was the testimony to the Senate and House intelligence committees and media briefs by US intelligence officials regarding the Israeli strike on a Syrian facility in September ‘07 and North Korean involvement in that facility.  

The US decided to give that briefing despite Israeli objections, in particular from the Israeli security establishment as reported in today’s Haaretz:

Defense Minister Ehud Barak opposed the release of any new details on the attack or the nuclear ties between Damascus and Pyongyang, arguing that this would only push the Syrians into a corner and would escalate tensions.

Of course those briefings are the prerogative of the administration, and Congress had the right to demand such disclosures.  But the subtext to this story is another, perhaps more remarkable, example of the Bush Administration being an obstacle to, rather than promoter of, Arab-Israeli peace.  

Yesterday’s intelligence briefing happened due to unrelenting neocon pressure from Congress led by Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Peter Hoekstra, from elements within the administration and in particular from recently retired officials, with John Bolton riding herd. 

Their apparent aim was a two-fer:  undermine the North Korea six party talks and undermine any prospect of renewed Israeli-Syrian peace talks—mirroring the agenda of the Israeli right wing opposition (old buddies of the neocons).  On this score there was little to worry about—the Bush administration is now seen in both Jerusalem and Damascus as the main obstacle to a resumption of peace negotiations.  To get Israel and Syria to agree on this is quite an achievement.

Here is what President Assad said in an interview to Qatari daily al-Watan, published Thursday:

“[Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan had] ‘relayed to me Israel’s readiness to withdraw from the Golan Heights in return for peace with Syria [. . .]direct negotiations need a sponsor and, unfortunately, this sponsor can only be the U.S. This is the reality of the situation. But the current administration has no vision and no will to support a peace process [. . .] perhaps with a future administration in the U.S., we would be able to speak of direct negotiations. 

Israeli Prime Minister Olmert would of course not directly criticize President Bush—but here is what Israel’s top political commentators, well-briefed by the PM’s office, are saying:

[. . .] it is almost certain that the negotiations will not be renewed in the near future—at least not until the next tenant takes up residence in the White House in January 2009 and sponsors an initiative to revitalize the negotiations with American patronage and financial support. (Shimon Shiffer, Yedioth Ahronoth,4/24/08)

Is there or is there not a channel of negotiations with Syria?  Olmert merely hints at who, at this stage, is preventing such a dialogue.  His name is George W. Bush.  When will it be possible for Israel to talk to Syria?  When Bush leaves the White House [. . .] when Washington gives the green light (Ben Caspit, Ma’ariv, 4/18/08)

Almost all the Israeli security establishment supports rapprochement with Syria—the Defense Minister, Chief of Staff, Head of Intelligence, etc. 

In fact, yesterday was a rather telling day from several angles. Representative Gary Ackerman chaired a House FRC Middle East hearing: “U.S. Policy and the Road to Damascus: Who's Converting Whom?”

Martin Indyk—director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings and former US Ambassador to Israel—was one of those providing testimony.  Said Indyk:

As I understand it, the Bush Administration is unwilling to encourage Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations [. . .] this puts the U.S. in the unprecedented and invidious position of opposing an opportunity for Arab-Israeli peacemaking even when our ally Israel is keen to pursue it.

Of course, now in year seven, the Bush administration has launched one peace effort – the Israeli-Palestinian Annapolis process.  But that has all the appearances of a sham – no delivery on the ground to speak of, exclusion of key actors (such as Hamas), and nothing serious being done to create the conditions to implement anything even if a paper is agreed on.

Will Bush’s successor be a promoter of or an obstacle to Arab-Israeli conflict resolution and peace-making, and, just as important, will that successor act in year one or wait for year seven?

promote meaningful American leadership to end the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israel conflicts peacefully and diplomatically. We support a new direction for American policy in the Middle East and a broad public and policy debate about the U.S. role in the region…J Street represents Americans, primarily but not exclusively Jewish, who support Israel and its desire for security as the Jewish homeland, as well as the right of the Palestinians to a sovereign state of their own - two states living side-by-side in peace and security. We believe ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in the best interests of Israel, the United States, the Palestinians, and the region as a whole.…[and we support] diplomatic solutions over military ones, including in Iran; multilateral over unilateral approaches to conflict resolution; and dialogue over confrontation with a wide range of countries and actors when conflicts do arise.

In my personal capacity, I am of course supportive of J Street, and there have been many positive pieces written about it.  Here’s a very small selection:  Jeremy Ben-Ami has this op-ed in the Forward, Ezra Klein writes ‘No Time For Neutrality’ at the American Prospect, and Spencer Ackerman discusses ‘Reframing the Israel Debate’ in the Washington Independent. 

Additionally, there has been a pile of news coverage on the J Street launch in the Washington Post, Haaretz, the JTA, and elsewhere. 

Of course, the praise has not been unanimous, with a push-back coming from some expected places.  The counter-positions have included pieces by Noah Pollak at Commentary and Michael Goldfarb at the Weekly Standard.

And finally—a piece I wrote in my personal capacity can be read at the Huffington Post.

We are benefiting from one thing, and that is the attack on the Twin Towers and Pentagon, and the American struggle in Iraq…[events that] swung American public opinion in our favor.

He uttered these words at Bar Ilan University as reported by the Ma'ariv newspaper—it seems the speech was in Hebrew (read: something we weren't supposed to know about).  But MJ reminds us that is nothing new for Netanyahu. Here is what he said in September 2001:

It's very good. Well, not very good, but it will generate immediate sympathy…[and] strengthen the bond between our two peoples, because we've experienced terror over so many decades, but the United States has now experienced a massive hemorrhaging of terror.

So sayeth the best friend that American neocons have in Israel—a thought that should give all pause.  ‘Nuff said.

Israel has pledged to reduce the impediments to access and movement in the West Bank. This will begin with the removal of about 50 roadblocks and immediate steps to upgrade checkpoints to reduce waiting time without sacrificing security.

The most credible and quoted source for keeping a tab on this is the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) of the UN.  Their latest closure tally of all obstacles to Palestinian movement in the West Bank was 580—a quite stunning number for an area that is smaller than the state of Delaware (the 2^nd smallest state in the US).  That 580 number came before the latest commitment to improve things.

So, how’s it going? 

Rather well actually—until that is, one checks the small print.

The IDF stated that it has removed 61 obstacles.  It provided a list of those 61 to OCHA with the relevant GPS coordinates (the IDF knows that without the OCHA kosher certificate this will not be taken seriously, and yes, the IDF works with the UN).  OCHA took the list and GPS coordinates and did what it does best—checked the reality on the ground.

OCHA gave an update briefing to some diplomats and others last week (partially reported in Haaretz)—it was off the record, but here are the findings:  Of the 61 obstacles on the list, 44 had indeed been removed.  Six were still in place and OCHA found no proof of the prior existence of the final 11 obstacles supposedly done away with.  44—not bad…except this—only 5 of those 44 were part of OCHA’s previous 580 count.  How so?  Well the other 39 were not considered to have been real obstacles of any relevance or significance to Palestinian movement in the first place—in fields or areas inaccessible to Palestinians or of no real affect. 

There is a phrase in English for this, for what has happened so far in implementing the latest commitments on obstacle removal—it is called being done up like a kipper…

Imagine Philippe Starck and Daniel Libeskind are commissioned to design an Israeli checkpoint in the West Bank - imposing exterior, breezy interior, daring splashes of light and color. Sometimes it seems this is the image being promoted by the newly privatized and civilianized checkpoints and crossings popping up in the territories. When it comes to dress codes, the drab olive of military fatigues is decidedly passe, having been replaced by the crisp uniforms of private security contractors.

A half-dozen such terminals are operated by private companies - from Al-Jalama near Jenin, to Sha'ar Ephraim near Tul Karm, from Reihan to Tarqumiya. According to a recent Channel 10 news report, the Israel Defense Forces is planning to privatize all the checkpoints in the seam area. No more wasting soldiers' time. The IDF is selling the idea in win-win terms: better security for Israelis,better service for the Palestinians.

That we should still be exploring modalities for reinventing and improving the occupation, rather than ending it, after more than 40 years, is troubling enough in itself. But the decision by the state to outsource so basic a national security function with barely an eyebrow raised or question asked, will likely prove, in time, another example of how what we sow in the territories we later reap back home.

This phenomenon of a more private occupation complements a broader Israeli trend of outsourcing functions, including those of a sensitive nature, that were previously the state's purview. And the privatization of the military is a ubiquitous global affair. Private military firms (PMFs) now provide logistical, maintenance and consulting services, as well as actual combat duties, to contractors in more than 50 countries.

The world has accumulated a fair amount of experience in outsourcing military services and Israel would do well to take notice. The American presence in Iraq has become something of a laboratory for PMF-watchers. There, in addition to the traditional grunt jobs, private contractors have taken on core military functions, such as protecting important installations, escorting convoys, and even operating missile-defense systems. It was also PMF employees who were at the center of the Abu Ghraib prisoner-abuse scandal.

And then there is the case of Blackwater, dubbed by Senator Jim Webb of Virginia, himself ex-military, "rent-an-army." Last September, Blackwater company guards shot and killed 17 Iraqi civilians at a Baghdad intersection. That episode finally cast a spotlight on the shadowy existence of one of the Iraq war's greatest beneficiaries. Blackwater barely existed 10 years ago, but, according to The Guardian, the politically well-connected company has been awarded over $750 million in government contracts since mid-2004, often in the form of non-competitive tenders.

There is no scandal of the Blackwater scale waiting to erupt in Israel, but the issues now being investigated in the U.S. regarding the uses and abuses of PMFs merit our attention. The obvious dilemmas begin with the question of how PMF contracting can coexist with the principle of the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force. In addition to crossings and checkpoints, private companies in the West Bank are patrolling the separation barrier and other security-sensitive spots (such as the tunnel on Route 60). They are deployed at Gaza's Erez crossing and apparently at the fuel depot in Nahal Oz. Their workers are outside the military chain of command and justice system, they are removed from governmental and legislative oversight, functioning in a legal twilight zone.

By definition, a private company does not operate on the basis of the public good - unlike its client, the state, it has different incentives, mainly profit. This can influence decisions on recruitment criteria, quality of equipment procured, investment in training, rotation of personnel, and more. PMFs also add another layer of bureaucracy and possible confusion to an already convoluted mix of Israeli state actors. The use of contractors has a distorting effect on the real costs of a particular security posture and policy. And, finally, civilians - unlike soldiers - can always walk off the job.

Machsom Watch (an NGO that actively monitors the goings-on at checkpoints) has reported an increase in tensions, reduced channels of communication, and a more explosive situation at the privately run terminals. Lose-lose: less security, worse service. The privatization of the occupation needs to be reconsidered.

All this is not an appeal for bringing back the boys (and girls) in green. The occupation and its checkpoints and terminals will not be benevolent, whether they are staffed by soldiers, private contractors or bagel-makers. That much should be clear by now. But we should be careful in our rush to privatize state security functions - whether in the context of occupation or when, finally, we have agreed-upon permanent borders and passages.

When the reality about PMFs in Iraq was just emerging, the Brookings Institution published a report on "Outsourcing War." This is its conclusion, which should be read in Jerusalem (and reread in Washington): "The U.S. military must take a step back and reconsider, from a national security perspective, just what roles and functions should be kept in government hands."

al-Ayyam:  What would you say to those Israelis who are calling on their government to talk to Hamas?
KM:  I would advise them to pressure their government to stop its aggression against our people, end the occupation, and recognize Palestinian rights, especially since the Arabs and         Palestinians have adopted a joint position regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state within the borders of 1967.
al-Ayyam:  When you say ‘the borders of 1967,’ is that a strategic position or just tactics?
KM:  Most Palestinian factions agreed in the [Fatah-Hamas] Accord Document signed in 2006 that a future Palestinian state should be established within the borders of 1967, including Jerusalem, as well as the right of return and full sovereignty. This is the Palestinian position. It is also the official Arab position, with a few differences in detail. Israel has to declare its commitment to such a solution.
al-Ayyam:  But the Europeans and Americans say that Hamas calls for the destruction of the state of Israel, and consequently would have nothing to do with it. What would you say to them?
KM:  We as a movement are committed to a political program that we agreed upon with other Palestinian factions, a program that is supported by the Arab world. Consequently, the Americans, Europeans, and other international parties must reconcile themselves with this political reality and must judge us accordingly. You do not judge people by what you believe is in their heads, but by what they have committed themselves to on paper. The major challenge facing the Americans and others in the international community is how to force Israel into accepting what we have offered. This is the solution. After that, whether one wishes to recognize Israel or not is his affair.

Palestinian national unity is essential, and dealing with the current state of disunity is critical...However, there are many other factors that have been acting against the possibility of dialogue, and these unfortunately have had the upper hand. The most important of these negative factors has been U.S. and Israeli interference. Sadly, inter-Palestinian dialogue is now more of an American decision than it is a Palestinian or an Arab one…Only when the Americans realize that coercion does not work will they begin working for reconciliation as the only means for pushing Palestinian-Israeli peace talks forwards.

SPIEGEL: Is there a risk of Hamas taking over the West Bank?
Barak: There is a clear risk that this will happen. Not necessarily by bullets, though—it could possibly be by the ballot.
SPIEGEL: Would you cease negotiating with Abbas, if he and Hamas were to reconciliate?
Barak: I do not pretend to control their events. We are against Hamas. But I am in no position to say whether it is better for them to have a unity government or whether Abbas should try to re-conquer the Gaza Strip. To those of my Israeli cabinet colleagues who think we can easily destroy Hamas, I am saying: You cannot dictate this to another person. It didn’t work in Afghanistan and not in Iraq. It doesn’t work in the Middle East.

Barak’s comments on Iraq and Afghanistan are interesting as a stand alone, but on the Israel/Hamas issue, as Ma’ariv lead commentator Ben Caspit noted

“contrary to the official position of the government of Israel, Barak refrained from declaring that in such a case (the case of Abbas forming a unity government with Hamas—DL)…Israel would break off contact with Abu Mazen…From Barak’s statements it emerges that the ‘disk has been changed recently’, at least in the security establishment, and the illusions that it will be possible ‘to bring down Hamas rule’, or ‘to shatter the organization,’ have become obsolete, and that Israel is now prepared to consider another policy" (Ben Caspit, Ma’ariv).

Ehud Barak, as minister of Defense, probably has more influence over Israel’s day-to-day policy vis a vis Hamas than anyone else.  Is Barak possibly leading a realist line within the Israeli cabinet—skepticism regarding Annapolis and a focus on looking afresh at the internal Palestinian situation and the Gaza reality—perhaps even suggesting that a new security dynamic based on these would allow for a more meaningful Annapolis process?  

That is probably me speculating too far.  I do think that there is a debate within the Israeli establishment and an element of a rethink regarding Hamas, the approach to Gaza and the approach to Palestinian national unity.  I do not think that a strong case is being made, at least not yet, in favor of pursuing a cease-fire and a green-light for Palestinian national unity as a building block for more robust peace negotiations.  Even if the Mashal and Barak interview content was not coordinated (and I doubt it was), it is still part of an ongoing interaction of testing and prodding between Israel and Hamas that sometimes expresses itself in violence, sometimes in interview and words, and sometimes via mediators.  

That interaction is not static but it is still insufficiently dynamic and decisive.  Here is the option that I among others have been advocating:

1)  A cease-fire package is reached that includes:  no attacks from Gaza into Israel or vice-versa, more effective and verifiable efforts to prevent weapons entering Gaza, the opening of Gaza crossings in an agreed, appropriate and monitored way, for goods and persons, between Gaza and Israel and Gaza and Egypt.  To be sustainable the cease-fire would almost certainly have to be extended to the West-Bank.  Ideally the package is expanded to include a prisoner exchange seeing the release of Gilad Shalit.  

2)  Ideally this package is agreed between Israel and President Abbas who also acts on behalf of Hamas.  He has brokered deals that include Hamas in the past.  If such an option continues to prove impossible then Israel reaches a set of back-to-back arrangements regarding Gaza (as above and probably mediated by Egypt) and with the PA regarding the role it would play (including at the Gaza border crossings).

3)  The Palestinians resume a national dialogue which does not entail the threat of an Israeli or American veto or the cessation, as a consequence, of the peace process.  The details would probably be different but the basic outline would be similar to the Mecca agreement (of February 2007)—including acceptance of the authority of Abbas to negotiate with Israel.  Obviously to succeed better than last time, a new Palestinian internal arrangement would require broader acceptance, effective implementation and external support.  

4) Political negotiations continue between Israel and Abbas under conditions of improved security and with a Palestinian interlocutor who has greater authority and legitimacy to both pursue talks and to implement anything agreed.  Ideally, Syria is also re-engaged in a substantive diplomatic way, a move which could positively impact both the regional and intra-Palestinian dynamic (but more of that another time).  

So why is it not happening?  

• For starters, Israel has yet to make the switch in relation to the internal Palestinian scene and is apparently unsure whether it prefers a non-implementable shelf agreement or an implementable end-of-occupation agreement.
• The Fatah leadership has yet to make up its own mind on whether it is ready for the power-sharing and PLO reform that internal reconciliation entails. The group around Abbas remains unenthusiastic, but according to reports a new force is emerging in Fatah (informally known as the group of 25—all members of the Fatah Revolutionary Council) who back extensive reform within Fatah, renewed dialogue with Hamas and an anti-corruption drive amongst other things.  The group’s leaders are thought to include Marwan Barghouti, Nasser al-Kidwa (former PLO UN Ambassador and Yasser Arafat’s nephew), Ahmed Hils (an anti-Dahlan Fatah leader in Gaza), and Jibril Rajoub (an ex-security chief).  
• Hamas may not at the moment be ready for the above kind of deals on terms that could be accepted by Israel and Fatah respectively.  Much of the Middle East and certainly America’s adversaries are adopting a Keith Olberman posture—they are counting down the days of the Bush administration and are in no mood to facilitate any Bush achievements.  
• And U.S. Policy.  The Bush administration still seems to think that an agreement on paper will overcome a complex reality rather than what is staring most people in the face, that a complex reality will undermine an agreement on paper.  

At this stage the temptation is to yawn and move on.  After 15 years of a peace process which has been paralleled by the ongoing creation of settlement facts on the ground, that undermine the apparent goal of a two state solution, the questions raised are old ones.  But it might be worth trying to eek out some new answers.  In the light of this old/new development of Annapolis and settlement growth going hand in hand, here is an attempt to look afresh at 5 of those questions. 

What drives settlement expansion?  Obviously there is a core of ideologically driven Israelis for whom life in the hills of Judea and Samaria is the fulfillment of a biblical injunction.  Them and groups they established, led by Gush Emunim (the bloc of the faithful) led the move to establish permanent civilian communities in the territories occupied in 1967.  But their task could not have been achieved without a combination of acquiescence and active facilitation by the various organs of the Israeli governmental bureaucracy and defense establishments.  They cooperated for reasons that ranged from sharing the ideology to security-based arguments, for some it was establishing bargaining chips for future negotiations and for others just a question of the political inconvenience of confronting the settlers.  And the settlers have been strategic.  When settlements started being built in the vicinity of Jerusalem for the ultra-Orthodox communities (until then settlements were mainly modern or national Orthodox, or economically-driven as opposed to ultra-Orthodox) the settler movement won a new ally in the political representatives of the ultra-Orthodox community—the Shas and United Torah Judaism parties.  In the current governing coalition the Shas party makes the growth of the settlements serving their community one of their key political demands. Today the network of enablers that the settlers have throughout the system translates into a reality whereby the gravity or inertia of Israeli state bureaucracy in itself drives settlement expansion.  Recognizing that what drives settlement growth goes deeper than the supposed nefarious schemes of any given Israeli Prime Minister is important for devising a strategy to counter this phenomenon.

It is perfectly plausible (and I for one would argue) that the current Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, is sincere in his professed intention to reach a two state solution and to withdraw from at least the vast majority of the West Bank.  He may even be genuine when arguing that the current settlement growth is anyway in areas that will feature in a future land swap and is a necessary coalition bargain that is cut in order to sustain a government that is negotiating the end of the occupation and therefore of the settlement project.  In a simple cost-benefit calculation, for an Israeli Prime Minister the price of freezing settlements is higher than what is paid for continuing them.  Which brings us to our next question.

Given the continued settlement drive, is a two state solution still realistic?  First there is a question here of the need for a viable Palestinian state.  One could carve out any piece of territory, put a flag on it, and call it the ‘Palestinian Free State’.  But if the borders, the conditions and nature of that state, its credibility and legitimacy have no traction with the Palestinians, then it becomes almost an irrelevance in its ability to change the Israeli-Palestinian reality.  Obviously any additional Israeli presence beyond the ’67 line creates further obstacles to address in the negotiations and to remove as part of any bargain.  Is it possible to remove 90 settlements but not 100?  Probably not.  This is not an exact science.  The continued relevance of the two-state solution may have less to do with the physical fact of an additional 1900 housing units and more to do with the cognitive perceptions and spatial maps created in people’s minds by the physical structures on the ground.  This is a point that is paid to little attention to.  The announcement of more building in a given settlement has a devastating impact on the Palestinian belief that a real two state solution will happen.  It dramatically undermines those advocating such a solution or involved in negotiations to that end, and it also of course sends a signal to the Israeli public.  The two state solution is likely to be labeled RIP in people’s heads long before it becomes technically unfeasible on the ground. That is the challenge.

So what can the U.S. and the international community do about it?  40 years after the 1967 war (and 120 settlements later, 105 outposts, and 267,000 Israelis living beyond the green line), it is abundantly clear at this stage that the U.S. and international response has not been a robust one, and it has not sufficiently affected the ledger of the Israeli cost-benefit calculation in a way that prohibits settlement expansion.  That this is unfortunate is something that even most Israelis would probably now accept given the regret now voiced regarding the investments made in the territories and the intention expressed to withdraw.  Three options remain.  One would be to pursue policies that try to re-balance that basic Israeli calculation. To raise this suggestion is hardly a eureka moment.  It has been considered.  That leverage has not been easy to summon in the past, nor will it be in the future.  A second option is to be more effective at the preventive stage.  If more consistent, persistent and higher level U.S. attention is paid to this issue then new plans can be caught while they’re still in the process of decision making within the Israeli system.  It is much more difficult to affect the process once an announcement has been made.  The final option is to make good on the second half of the equation that is consistently heard from the Israeli side.  Namely, ‘we cannot both freeze settlements and continue negotiations, because of domestic politics, turn a blind eye to the former so we can pursue the latter.’ The response might be, ‘Ok, so let’s finish those negotiations now’.

What about the Palestinians?  Do they have a role?  In part this relates to the previous question.  Third parties cannot be more Palestinian than the Palestinians.  And if the PLO agrees to continue negotiating with Israel while settlements are being expanded in contravention of agreements reached, then why would others take a harder line.  This has been the reality since the beginning of the Oslo process.  One senior PLO figure, its Secretary General Yasser Abed Rabbo, has just called for a halt in the talks and for the Palestinians to generate a crisis over the settlement issue.  This tool has been deployed rarely and even then unsuccessfully in the past, and many Palestinians would respond that they are not doing anyone a favor by negotiating but simply trying to advance their own national interest,  and that it would be an own goal to walk away from the talks.  Suspending talks might also encourage Israelis to do the same over any number of issues and perhaps also ignores the power disequilibrium between the two parties. 

An alternative course of action was recently suggested by Israeli Housing Minister Ze’ev Boim.  In explaining why he was re-launching new settlement construction in Givat Ze’ev he noted that the work was suspended due to the outbreak of violence in the second intifida, but now that violence had ebbed, building could resume.  Ipso facto, if there is enough Palestinian violence, work will be abandoned.  The point was not lost on former Palestinian minister Kadura Fares in this powerful recent Ha’aretz op-ed which ended:  “Mr. Boim, we got the message.  Will anyone in Israel yet accuse you of incitement to rebellion and resistance?”

But Kadura Fares did not advocate violence and other Palestinian have suggested that a civil disobedience or non violent resistance campaign targeting the settlements would be the most effective course of action.  That strategy has appeared fleetingly in response to the separation barrier at Bi’lin and elsewhere, but has yet to be deployed more broadly.  Such an approach might have an effect on Israeli actions just as the negotiations walk-out might interestingly impact the actions of the U.S. and Quartet.       

Finally, is there a bottom line?  Settlements may in the end scupper the two state project, but it is too early to know and if anything, the fact that Israel evacuated all settlements in Gaza and 4 in the Northern West Bank suggests otherwise.  More can be done to affect the pace and extent of settlement expansion, obviously by Israel, but also by the U.S. and Palestinians themselves.  But ultimately, absent a permanent agreed border this problem will fester and frustrate.  Ending the occupation will end the issue of settlements.  Trying to limit or freeze settlements under conditions of an ongoing occupation has been and continues to be a thankless task. 

Yesterday, Tuesday, the New York Times ran a long front page article about the Hamas use of incitement against Jews and Israel. The first thing to say about the piece is that it is almost certainly accurate and not something that can be easily dismissed.  There are problems with some of the sources but beyond this article there is the need to recognize the full range of causes of mutual anger, hatred, and suspicion.  There are no excuses for the incitement that Steve Erlanger highlights, there are though more ways to be more serious about combating it. 

The article describes not only the commonplace exhortations from the pulpit during Friday prayers—the Jews are “the brothers of apes and pigs” went one jingle—but also the pervasive influence of anti-Semitic propaganda in many Hamas-led TV channels.  Whether made manifest in newspaper articles, or displayed on children’s TV puppet shows, the penchant for vitriol is not really in question.

These instances and examples are a troubling phenomenon, are part of the Israeli-Palestinian reality and also help shape that reality.  Sure, one could point to the ugly statements made by religious leaders and Rabbis in Israel, including two recent diatribes: Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu’s proposal of “hanging the children of the terrorist who carried out the attack in the Mercaz Harav yeshiva from a tree”; or Rabbi Dov Lior’s halakhic ruling that Jewish law forbids the employment of, or renting of a home to, any Arab.  Additionally, one can see the effect of such incitement in society at large:  a recent poll by Ma’ariv-NRG said that 75% of the Israeli public would support the transfer of Israel’s Arab citizens to a future Palestinian state.  But those statements (and the wider trend they represent), as egregious as they are, do not excuse what is exposed in Steve Erlanger’s story.

The New York Times piece certainly would have been more credible had Erlanger resisted the temptation to use sources such as MEMRI and Palestinian Media Watch.

MEMRI, founded by former IDF colonel Yigal Carmon (who is currently the director), portrays itself as a non-partisan non-profit dedicated to bridging the language gap between the West and Middle East, through “timely translations of Arabic, Persian, and Turkish media, as well as original analysis of political, ideological, intellectual, social, cultural, and religious trends in the Middle East”. 

Sounds very innocuous, but MEMRI’s output looks more like an anti-Arab and anti-Muslim propaganda machine.  Carmon’s post-IDF career initially sent him as a representative of Likudist groups to lobby Congress against the then Israeli Government of Yitzhak Rabin in the early 1990’s.  Carmon has been a consistent foe of the Oslo process since its inception—MEMRI is the sophisticated mechanism through which he channels his far-right ideology.  Here is what Juan Cole—who knows a thing or two about the Arab media—has to say on MEMRI: 

The organization cleverly cherry-picks the vast Arabic press, which serves 300 million people, for the most extreme and objectionable articles and editorials. It carefully does not translate the moderate articles. I have looked at newspapers that ran both tolerant and extremist opinion pieces on the same day, and checked MEMRI, to find that only the extremist one showed up.

Palestinian Media Watch, founded by Itamar Marcus, is arguably even more partisan than MEMRI.  A brief perusal of the PMW website suggests that the entire Palestinian raison d’etre is to incite hate against Jews.  A little reductionist one might say.  It seems the PMW is at least as tainted with hatred of Palestinians as are the episodes of Palestinian intolerance towards Jews, which it seeks to expose.  PMW’s reliability is very questionable.  Here is just one example of a debunking of a study its director, Itamar Marcus, conducted on textbooks (I will post more about MEMRI and especially PMW in the near future).

Using these sources was problematic, but Erlanger is a serious journalist and the article includes his reporting from Gaza and direct interviews that are not connected to MEMRI or PMW. So his basic thesis is accurate that this kind of incitement does exist, and it cannot be ignored.

There is another unnecessary glitch in the article. The use of Fatah sources is emblematic of a trend in which certain elements within Fatah are now very eager to tell the Western press what they assume it wants to hear regarding their internal political rivals.   Of course, the incitement argument was used for so many years against Fatah itself, and still is in many quarters.  There were constant attempts to derail the Oslo process by highlighting speeches from Fatah and PLO leaders, what was broadcast and what was taught.  Under PM Netanyahu, as part of the Wye River memorandum of 1998, a Tri- Lateral (Israeli-Palestinian-American) Anti-Incitement Committee was established.  The incitement question has been a genuine ongoing problem, but has also been repeatedly used as a stick to beat the Palestinians by people who have no interest in peace, ending prejudice, a two state solution, or ending the occupation. 

This is not about what should or should not have been in the NYT piece, but about a bigger picture that needs to be kept in mind.  The challenge is to take both incitement and peace-making seriously.  That issue, of incitement then and now, reminds us of two points that should not be forgotten amidst all the justified ‘oy veys’ that will be heard in the wake of the NYT article.  

First, anyone who is serious about incitement has to take seriously the impact that the realities on the ground have on young Palestinians and how they view Israel.  Yes, incitement is impactful and deplorable. There is also very strong case to be made that the endless humiliations of the occupation and its manifestations in checkpoints, closures, military raids, and sonic boom over flights, etch a more powerful image into a young Palestinian conscience than words occasionally heard on unpopular TV stations or on a mosque on a Friday.  To create an entire industry dedicated to cataloging every instance of the latter, but that totally ignores, or worse totally condones or supports the former, suggests a political and ideological agenda that actually has very little to do with overcoming and changing a reality of mutual fear, suspicion, and hatred.   Spending a lifetime documenting TV puppet shows but doing nothing about the daily violence of the occupation suggests a real lack of seriousness when it comes to battling hatred in future generations.  What it suggests is ulterior motives. 

Second, Israel, America and the International community all worked (and continue to work) with Fatah, even while claims of incitement were being raised, argued over and condemned.  That same approach should be pursued with Hamas.  It is the approach that Israel has taken correctly with Egypt and Jordan.  It is undoubtedly also true that plenty of American allies in Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention the lesser hot-spots in the region, are hardly squeamish when it comes to the accusations and rhetorical insults they hurl at America.  Yet America still works with these allies.

Some have claimed that the lesson to learn is that one should not pursue a peace process without first addressing and putting an end to incitement.  But reconciliation and occupation do not make happy bedfellows.  Can you end hate by closing a TV channel, newspaper or mosque but maintaining a siege on Gaza, 580 obstacles to movement in the West Bank, 121 settlements, and at least 130 Palestinian civilians killed in 2007 (plus the deaths of 53 Palestinian minors)?  Not so much.  To get real about incitement, you also have to get real about the full range of grievances that drive anger on both sides.  Ending the occupation may be a precondition for reconciliation—reversing that equation cannot make any sense whatsoever.

As Glenn Kessler pointed out in yesterday’s Washington Post, time is running out on this Administration and the Secretary of State’s unfinished tasks list is a dauntingly long one. Given the primacy accorded to Annapolis and the time and travel invested, the Israeli-Palestinian process would appear to assume pride of place.

The Annapolis season is scheduled to last one year, but with four months gone, the scorecard makes for predictably depressing reading. Economic conditions and freedom of movement in the West Bank have, if anything, deteriorated; settlements are expanding and not a single outpost has gone; Israelis and Palestinians are less secure. Both leaders – Ehud Olmert and Abu Mazen are still alive politically (and that admittedly was not a given) but both are still in a precariously fragile state.

Belief in the process barely registers with either public. Still the Administration continues to tout its goal of a breakthrough agreement by years-end, the president will visit in May and Rice even notched up some minor progress on this trip. So where do things stand and what are the prospects?

Here are five comments on the latest developments:

1 – One Step Forward, Two Steps…

The one deliverable from the Rice visit came from a trilateral meeting attended by, in addition to the Secretary herself, the Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak and the Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyed. This produced an agreement on “concrete steps to implement the Roadmap. This is a program that will improve the daily lives of Palestinians and help make Israel secure [. . .] Prime Minister Fayyad and Defense Minister Barak agreed on points of special, immediate emphasis and work.”

Those steps are detailed in a one page document released by the State Department that includes Israeli commitments to ease certain movement restrictions, to allow additional Palestinian security deployments, building authorizations and economic projects. None of this is new. Similar commitments have been made before by Israel to the US and PA and were reneged on. To even squeeze this list out of MoD Barak was an achievement given the spoiler role he has assumed since returning to Government, and this time Secretary Rice promised “a more systematic approach [. . .] to monitoring and verifying.”

The Catch 22 is that absent either a political deal or real change in the security environment (such as a comprehensive ceasefire with Hamas) – and the two are connected - the Israeli security default position translates into constant back-sliding on all these issues (justified or otherwise that is the reality). 

Take a closer look at that package produced in honor of the Secretary’s visit:

There are now 580 obstacles to Palestinian freedom of movement in the tiny area of the West Bank, more than at the time of Annapolis and about 30 more than at this time last year.  Barak committed to removing 50, net change +/- 20 and that is if all is implemented and there is no slippage.

Barak agreed to allow PA security deployment in Jenin, with restrictions, and some new measures on security coordination. Nice, but the last town that received such treatment was Nablus and in that experiment the IDF continued ongoing military operations that undermined the PA security efforts and deeply embarrassed the PA leadership. This latest very public announcement will do nothing to stem the tide of internal Palestinian criticism that increasingly depicts the PA as a puppet of Israel. That impression is further enhanced when Israel announces that it will allow the transfer of certain arms and armored vehicles to the PA.  Sometimes it is better to shut up. 

The third basket of commitments was described as follows:

“The two sides approved in concept the development of new housing in the West Bank for Palestinians [. . .] Master Plans for 25 Palestinian villages in Area C have been approved.”

Nothing like this particular snippet to remind Palestinians just how much Israel still controls their lives and just about everything in the West Bank – and just how limited the mandate of the PA is.

The final treat in this festive Easter egg of goodies – economic projects – “Both sides have agreed to create a major new industrial park in Tarqumiya” and to hold an “investment conference in Bethlehem”. To anyone who has followed the last decade and a half of peace-processing this will sound tragically familiar. Industrial Park plans existed before (for example, a 90 million dollar project called the Gaza Industrial Estate and joint government of Israel-PA plan for industrial parks in Jenin, Sha'ar Ephraim, Erez and Karni crossings, and Jericho) and stranger than strange none of them ever seem to materialize. Would it be too mean-spirited to suggest that occupation, attendant insecurity and unpredictability and undefined borders simply do not provide the best climate for investor confidence or business success?!

And yes, that would be the same Bethlehem where Israel conducted a recent extra-judicial killing of four Palestinians that saw the largest protests that city can remember – ‘welcome to happy, holy Bethlehem’.

It all sounds rather reminiscent of the Access and Movement Agreement negotiated by Secretary Rice in November 2005 and ignored by everyone else ever since.

To give some credit, I think Rice has little faith that this list of action items will produce meaningful change – one of the successes of her recent diplomacy was to de-link day-to-day issues from negotiations and to recognize the limited potential of improvements on the ground absent real political progress. Rice had to produce something, Barak was willing to throw together this pick’n’mix menu, the PA could at least point to something and everyone settled for what they could get.

If these measures at least put a brake on the slide to an even worse West Bank situation then that too is an achievement, though the announcements of new Israeli settlement expansion literally hours after the Secretary’s departure was hardly a good omen.

2 – How Many Generals Does It Take To Move A Checkpoint?

The US now has three generals deployed on the Israeli-Palestinian front as envoys with varying mandates and responsibilities. General Dayton oversees Palestinian security sector reform and cooperation, General Jones looks at regional security issues in the context of a prospective future peace deal, and General Fraser has perhaps the most thankless task – verifying the implementation of all those Roadmap commitments – including the new laundry list from this visit. All three are dedicated and respected professionals but their parallel missions do not enhance their chances of success.  The question for Secretary Rice is whether this latest mission served to strengthen or fatally undermine her new Special Envoy Lt. General William Fraser? About two and a half weeks ago Fraser convened his first trilateral meeting on Roadmap implementation – the Palestinian PM Fayyad showed up, but Israeli MD Barak skipped the meeting and sent the senior Defense Ministry strategist General Amos Gilad. It was impossible to pretend that this was not a slap in the face to the new US mission and Envoy from Mr. Ehud  Barak.

During this trip the Secretary of State convened a trilateral meeting – and lo and behold Barak found time to grace the occasion with his presence.

One of two things is happening here – either Barak has now set his bar for being there at nothing less than the Secretary level (with the corresponding impact on General Fraser’s standing and ability to function), or Ms. Rice introduced Mr.